



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS. — *Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Fahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Phil. Mon.* = *Philosophische Monatshefte*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL.

Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung. G. FREGE. *Z. f. Ph.*, C, I, pp. 25-50.

If equality is a relation between objects and not between names or signs for things, the proposition ' $a = b$ ' would not differ from ' $a = a$.' But the former is synthetic, the latter analytic. What we seem to express by ' $a = b$ ' is that the symbol ' a ' denotes the same thing as ' b ,' and the relation is therefore affirmed of the symbols. But this relation is mediated through the connection of each of the symbols with the same thing. The *difference* of the symbols must correspond to a difference in the manner in which the thing denoted is given. We must then recognize in a name or symbol (which may consist of one or more words), over and above the object denoted (*Bedeutung*), its sense (*Sinn*) or meaning. If three straight lines, a , b , and c , intersect in a point, 'the point of intersection of a and b ' will have the same denotation as 'the point of intersection of b and c ,' but not the same sense. The *sense* of such a name is always understood by every one who knows the language; a definite meaning is always attached to one sign: but a symbol may have no denotation, or more than one name may be used to denote the same object. In indirect speech symbols do not denote objects, but the meaning or sense of the speaker, or that which is commonly their meaning. The denotation of a word in indirect speech is thus its usual sense.

We must distinguish both the denotation and the sense of a name from the representation (*Vorstellung*) connected with it. Not always even in the same persons is the same *Vorstellung* connected with the same sense. The *Vorstellung* is subjective, and so differs essentially

from the sense of a name which can be common to several. The sense of a name, too, does not imply space and time relations, while these are always joined to a *Vorstellung*. We enquire now after the sense and denotation (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*) of assertory clauses which contain a complete thought. The thought is the *sense*, not the *denotation* of such a proposition, and this latter must be found in its relation to reality. It is the striving towards truth which urges us onward from the sense of a proposition to what it denotes. One may be tempted to regard the relation of thought to truth as that of the subject to the predicate. But subject and predicate are in a logical sense portions of a thought, which is formed by their connection, but never in this way do we pass from a thought to reality. Subordinate clauses have generally no complete meaning attaching to them, and consequently do not denote objects. This arises either from the fact that in subordinate clauses the words have their indirect signification, or through the incompleteness of these clauses, which only express a thought when taken in conjunction with the rest of the proposition.

If we found that the value for knowledge of ' $a = a$ ' and ' $a = b$ ' differs greatly, this is explained by the fact that the *sense* of a proposition, *i.e.* the thought which it expresses, is not less important than its denotation. Although a and b both denote the same object, yet their *sense* can be different, and consequently the thought expressed in the proposition ' $a = b$ ' different from that expressed in ' $a = a$.' If we understand under judgment the advance from thought to its correspondence with truth, we can also say that the judgments are different.

Wesen und Bedeutung der Impersonalien. R. F. KAINDL. Phil. Mon., XXVIII, 5 u. 6, pp. 278-305.

While according to grammar every sentence must have subject and predicate, and according to logic in every judgment of a subject a predicate concept must be asserted or denied, there seems to be no subject in such expressions as '*es donnert, mir ist wohl, es ist Tag.*' Impersonals may be treated from two points of view, the *psychologico-logical* and the *philologico-historical*. The present article is devoted principally to a logical investigation of the subject. Traditional logic teaches that the judgment has two members. Some, however, (Brentano, Miklosich, Marty,) find the essence of the judgment in the act of recognition or rejection, and claim that this can as well take place with one concept as with two. When Miklosich says that in the sentence '*pluit*' the subject is not only not expressed but also not even thought, he is right, but only in so far as he is thinking of an efficient subject. Here, as in the case of all impersonals, there is a subject in the wider sense. Every

judgment as thought has two members. The expression, however, may be incomplete, either the subject or the predicate being omitted. K. investigates the conditions under which the subject is omitted, and reaches the conclusion that impersonals of all classes name some definite occurrence or state of things without any thought of an efficient subject. The subject in the wider sense is the concrete-real occurrence or state which we have in mind but do not bring to spoken expression. K. discusses further the origin and proper designation of impersonals, and the significance of the third person singular, and of the 'es' or 'it' in such expressions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered, I. H. R. MARSHALL. *Mind*, I, 3, pp. 358-379.

Æsthetic theory has gained little of fundamental importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past. This is not because æsthetic problems have been neglected by the best thinkers, but rather because they have looked upon them as secondary issues. Non-hedonistic æsthetic theories have, from a psychological point of view, resulted in failure. Hedonic the æsthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this hedonic quality is of great moment, is a question to be determined. M. agrees that associations which are pleasurable are important elements in an æsthetic effect; but if the associationist means that æsthetic effect is determined altogether by pleasure-revivals, he cannot follow, for presentation pleasures certainly have much to do with the effects of beauty. If, on the other hand, the associationist means to identify hedonic phenomena and æsthetic phenomena, we are at once met with the objection that, while æsthetic states of mind are pleasurable, not all pleasurable states are allowed to pass for æsthetic. What are the bounds of the æsthetic within the hedonic field? Kant distinguishes the agreeable from the beautiful by the supposed presence of sense pleasure in the former, and the absence of the same in the latter. This distinction cannot be accepted. Eye and ear sensations are obvious exceptions; but if it be admitted that one set of senses can produce æsthetic effects, the whole contention fails, and a close examination shows clearly that the rest of the senses may act in the same manner in the make-up of æsthetic complexes. Pleasures of the typical emotions are also of great moment in æsthetics, but they do not stand alone, as some have held. 'Association' by itself can, of course, give no account of distinctively æsthetic effect. Recognized, as well as unrecognized,

usefulness seems to be an element. The distinction between the 'higher' and the 'lower' pleasures is illusory. It is the man who has grown to be capable of appreciating new ethical standards, and who has lost his pleasure in the old, who makes a distinction between pleasures of higher and lower grade. This by no means shows that what was pleasurable in his undeveloped or uncultivated state was not æsthetic for him at that time. Nor does it show that ethical standards are unimportant for æsthetics. What is 'immoral' is painful. But the mass of æsthetic effects are made up of elements entirely unmoral.

The Festal Origin of Human Speech. J. DONOVAN. *Mind*, I, 3, pp. 325-340.

Every event of life and nature that has awakened the reflection which distinguishes man from brute, is dwelt on by the savage through festal excitement. Of what use are measured sounds amid the wild excitement of the festal players? Musical sounds will, above all else, attract and absorb attention. Without implying anything of the nature of conscious choice, we may fairly assume that savages would be driven, at each revival of festal excitement, to feel out a way of making the sounds more and more absorbing. They could do this by bringing the sounds, however produced, into a more or less regular succession. At this very low stage of development musical instruments could not have existed; hence the vocal organs would be brought most prominently into use. Here the impulse to produce successive sounds would naturally result in articulation. The rudest music, too, would imply the modification of some sound in the continuous succession, *e.g.* by increase of stress in the blow struck. Hence, beyond a succession of mere units of sound, there would now be a succession of groups. To provide a similar modification in the vocal utterance required only a jerk of the breath. Articulate sounds could impose no particular order upon the confused feelings and perceptions of festal play; they could only wait while they entered into the order imposed upon them by the players' wild imitation of actions, and then preserve them in that order. When particular syllables got fixed upon particular actions, they would be brought up with them; and here two chief interests of the festal excitement would begin to clash, the interest of significance and that of merely pleasing sound. In later stages of development, the simply ear-attracting syllables are driven out of the significant phrases altogether, and left to refrains. D. does not attempt to show how impulses of festal excitement came to blend with conscious endeavors to make distinctions of meaning, or what the results of the blending would be.

La Musique d'après Herbert Spencer. JULES CAMBARIEN. Rev. Ph., XVII, 7, pp. 18-40.

In the language of an impassioned man Spencer finds all the elements of melody: burst of sound, quality or timbre, pitch, intervals, relative quickness of variations. All these phenomena, the physiological effects of psychological states (pleasure and pain), are in vocal music carried to their highest degree. This Spencerian theory is by no means new; we find its essential idea in many works of the eighteenth century. In spite of the many facts and examples offered by Spencer in support of his view, it needs but little musical sense to recognize its many weaknesses. Music has for its base the scale, which does not exist in speech. It is a system which rests partially on objective laws of sound, partially on convention. The scale is a work of art, a creation of the æsthetical sense. Spencer ignores this element. Further, he regards song as the exaggeration of instinctive speech. To exaggerate means to falsify. Melodies produced on this principle would be to true music what caricatures are to sculpture. We also demand of music that it be beautiful. Spencer fails to tell us whence we get this element. Besides, passion has some ugly physiological effects. Why does the musician relieve these by means of the beautiful? If Spencer were right anybody could be a musician. Finally, the most important element of music, that which no empirical theory can explain, is the *musical thought*. The most expressive timbres are meaningless without a unifying idea. This faculty of thinking in sounds is the result of a long cultivation of the æsthetical sense. The musical mind has grown from the language of sensation to that of abstraction. "Every musical thought is, at the same time, an imitation of the external world or at least an expression of feeling; every imitation of the external world or every expression of feeling is, at the same time, a musical thought."

Existence et Développement de la Volonté. ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Rev. Ph., XVII, 6, pp. 577-600.

Volition is neither a complexus of sensations nor a special faculty, but psychical force. Every state of consciousness is *idea* in so far as it involves discrimination (*discernment*), *force* in so far as it involves preference. Feeling and reaction are inseparable. Each particular sensation depends on the general sensibility, each particular reaction on the general activity. F. does not mean by *idea* a kind of psychical atom. There is no simple state of consciousness, every state being the resultant of an immense amount of action and reaction between us and the external world. Nor are the diverse states of consciousness and

ideas endowed with a detached force ; their action is that of the whole of consciousness, of which they are but the forms and actual manifestations.

There is another proof of the existence of will. Our presentations we refer to the external world ; our volitions, however, we attribute to ourselves. On this difference alone the distinction between subject and object can be based. Besides, the character of unity and continuity which we attribute to the ego would be incomprehensible without the continuous action of the will to live. Similarly our affections would remain inexplicable without will. Pleasure and pain are not mere passive additions to consciousness. There is present a tendency to maintain the pleasurable and reject the painful, consequently a spontaneous and inevitable choice or will. Every sensation is a complete psychological process with all its elements. We are everywhere active ; will ceases with life alone.

Whoever denies the existence of will must, on considering the matter physiologically, reduce all cerebral facts to simple peripheral impressions. But the absence of a central element can never be proved. Simple *cerebration* (to which the *idea* of a *possible* movement corresponds) is a state of tension in which a totality of little oscillatory movements counteract each other, while the actual triumph of a cerebral impulse implies a nervous discharge in a given direction. According to the resistance which the volition encounters both in execution and production, there is a more or less intense feeling of mental and cerebral effort. The usual distinction between sensorial and motor centres is artificial. Every centre is both. The centre moved, moves in its turn ; if there were no other centres in question, the shock given by the centripetal current would produce a centrifugal movement on the same path. Hence every sensation is at the same time impulse, every impulse sensation. Special inhibitory organs are also fictions. Two nervous currents reinforce or neutralize each other.

F. next considers the existence of will from the philosophical point of view. There are not two distinct realms, one of movement and one of thought. For the philosopher the world is but a phenomenon. It is vain to seek a real activity or causality in such a physical world, there being but successions of phenomena in time and space here. The true activity must be ascribed to the reality which dwells beneath the system of visible and tangible appearances. It is will. Will and feeling consciousness are everywhere. Philosophy will come to see in physical energy the external expression of psychical energy, *i.e.* will, which constitutes reality.

Beiträge zur vergleichenden Psychologie. Von KARL L. SCHAEFER. I. *Das Verhalten wirbelloser Tiere auf der Drehschue.* Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., III, pp. 185-192.

These experiments are in continuation of investigations on the perception of passive motion — more especially rotary motion — in which the reactors were vertebrates having semicircular canals. In this case invertebrates — snails, flies, beetles, ants, caterpillars, and ear-wigs — were placed on the rotary table and their reactions to rotary motion observed. S. found that the 'reactors' moved on a plane table against the motion of the table, though not in every case. The caterpillars did not move at all, the snails not always, and the beetles, ants, flies, and ear-wigs only when they were already in motion. Unlike the vertebrates, the invertebrates investigated showed no after effects of the rotary motion in the form of rotary giddiness.

Ueber die Empfindlichkeit des grünblinden und des normalen Auges gegen Farbenänderung im Spektrum. Von E. BRODHUN. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., III, pp. 97-107.

The earliest investigators had found that the eye was most sensitive to change of color near the D line of the spectrum (yellow). Next to this came the region near the F line (blue). Later, König and Dieterici found the maximum sensitiveness just left of the F line. Using an apparatus in which the adjacent spectra compared were produced by an equilateral flint-glass prism, the author compares his green-blind eye with A. König's normal eye. The method of mean errors was used, and for each region of the spectrum investigated fifty adjustments were made. B. found first that the greatest sensitiveness to difference for his green-blind eye was slightly to the left of the maximum for normal eyes, *i.e.* to the left of F; left from the maximum, the green-blind eye shows more sensitiveness than the normal, but then decreases rapidly, while the normal eye shows a second maximum in the yellow. Surmising that another small increase in the curve of sensitiveness beyond the F line was due to change in intensity rather than quality of light, B. varied the brightness of the fields of color. For both the normal and the green-blind eye the slight increase beyond F disappeared, while throughout the observed range of colors the sensitiveness became somewhat less. Similar results were found by W. Uthoff (*Gräfes Archiv*, 1888, Bd. 34), who used the method of minimal changes.

Maudi et le Calcul Mental. Rev. Scient., XLIX, pp. 363-365.

The investigation of Maudi, the French 'lightning calculator,' seems to show that he is more remarkable for memory than for the rapidity or

depth of his calculations. Thus he took ten minutes to perform the following five operations: 1st, addition of 22,423, 379,999, 823,111, 79,437; 2d, square of 940, and square of 953; 3d, division of 482,765 by 4760; 4th, cube root of 121,287,375; 5th, fifth root of 847,288,609,493. Of the ten minutes taken to perform the above, about five were devoted to repeating the numbers as they were given out. Good professional calculators could work out on paper and in about the same time all that Maudi did mentally; in fact, he simply used his extraordinary memory for figures where the common calculators used pen and paper. Whether his memory was auditory, neural, or motor was not determined: Maudi himself called it 'auditory,' but did not clearly understand what the term meant.

Sur quelques minimums perceptibles d'Odeur. Pas M. JAKUES PARRY. Compt. Rend., CXIV, pp. 785-788.

The odorous substances used were not complex natural 'essences,' but bodies which were chemically well defined. Expressing the threshold values in millionths of a gramme, P. found for camphor 5, for ether 1, for citral 0.5, for vanilla 0.005. The odoriferous power of an odor is to be distinguished from its intensity: the former is inversely as the threshold value; the latter is determined by the relative amount of a substance required to mask the odor of another. Thus, when threshold amounts of citral and vanilla are put together in a flask, the vanilla alone is perceived; but if the citral is increased tenfold in weight, the vanilla would have to be increased one hundred times to be perceptible. The intense substances correspond to Beaunis' odors [short reaction time]; and the powerful substances to Beaunis' perfumes [long reaction time]. The 'minimum perceptible' varies with different individuals, and with the same individual at different times.

ETHICAL.

Natural Selection in Morals. S. ALEXANDER. Int. J. E., II, 4, pp. 409-439.

Natural selection operates in morals and politics as well as in the vegetable and animal worlds, but with differences that have caused it to be misunderstood. In the former it is a struggle, not of lives, but of ideals. The reformer represents a plan of conduct that is a variation from the typical plan. A struggle ensues, the old unmodified plans of

life succumb under the influence of persuasion or education. A new demarcation between good and evil results ; indeed, this is the name given to the victory of one plan over its competitors. The success of a moral ideal, however, is not the cause, but only the proof of its goodness. Society as a whole may be compared to a genus of which the individual members are specimens. Because each one's plan of life is social, it appeals in some degree to the rest. The gradual transition from the struggle between individuals to the struggle between plans, is clearly traceable in the history of toleration. In more modern times it appears in conflicts over the theory of punishment. In reality, natural selection is on the side of those who pity rather than hate crime. Punishment is a weapon in the conflict of plans, a means of persuasion rather than of extermination. So, too, the ideas of the French Revolution were spread by armies ; at present democratic ideas are spread by persuasion. Natural selection offers no reason why every member of society should not be preserved and helped to live as effectively as he can. At the present time it is at work not so much in the fierce competition of business as in the struggle between the two rival systems of competition and collectivism.

An Analysis of the Idea of Obligation. F. C. SHARP. Int. J. E., II, 4, pp. 500-513.

Approbation or disapprobation is directed towards things as fit or unfit to accomplish desired ends. The altruist approves the labors of those who work to make life richer, and disapproves the opposite. Strong desire turns approbation into demand, while increased knowledge leads one to limit his demands by another's possibilities of compliance. This pressure of one will on another, demanding of it a certain course of action, is a strong social influence. If insufficient, it can be strengthened only by reward or punishment. These facts serve to explain moral obligation.

The *ought* involves an affirmation that a certain action is necessary as a means to a certain end and an emotion accompanying that affirmation. There are four distinguishable forms, — the 'I ought,' the 'you ought,' and the more impersonal forms culminating in the theological ought. The *ought* assumes the existence in another of the desire for an action, while the *must* makes no such assumption. When from the idea of obligation the element of the good or the ideal is eliminated, nothing remains but mere submission to an arbitrary imperative. Hence obligation cannot be the fundamental fact of moral experience.

METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL.

The Law of Mind. C. PIERCE. Monist, II, 4, pp. 533-559.

The tendency to regard continuity as an idea of prime importance in philosophy may be conveniently termed *synechism*. What synechism is and what it leads to, may be brought out by comment on the formula of mental action. Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind; namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of effectibility. The value of this law becomes apparent in view of the difficulties presented by the common theory of association of ideas. We are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to mind, as similar or dissimilar to one another. But taking the word 'idea' in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore cannot be compared. All relation, being between ideas, can exist only in some consciousness; now that past idea was in no consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; and that did not embrace the vicarious idea. Then, since we may not jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present, the conviction comes that it must be present by direct perception. We are thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps. The suggestion that consciousness necessarily embraces an interval of time is not tenable, if a finite time be meant. For if the sensation that precedes the present by half a second were still immediately before me, then, on the same principle, the sensation preceding that would be immediately present, and so on *ad infinitum*. All that is requisite is that we should be immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time. In this infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the temporal sequence of beginning, middle, and end. Now, upon this interval follows another, whose beginning is the middle of the former and whose middle is the end of the former. From the immediate perception of these two intervals we gain a mediate, or inferential, perception of the relation of all four instants. Now let there be not only an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception, but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time, and the result will be a mediate consciousness of the whole time in the last moment.

One of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it gives time a definite direction of flow from past to future, so that the

relation of past to future is different from the relation of future to past. The flow of time consists in the fact that, in reference to any individual state of feeling, all others are of two classes, those which affect this one and those which do not. The present is affectible by the past, but not by the future. Time involves a continuity of qualities which undergo a change continuous in time. The development of the human mind has practically extinguished all feelings except a few sporadic kinds. But originally all feelings may have been connected in a way indicated by the tridimensional spread of feelings in the case of colors. And the presumption is that the number of dimensions was endless, for development essentially involves a limitation of possibilities.

Feeling has also a subjective, or substantial, spatial extension. This is a difficult idea to seize, for the reason that it is a subjective, not an objective extension. It is not that we have a feeling of bigness; it is that the feeling, as a subject of inhesion, is big. Since space is continuous, it follows that there must be an immediate community of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together. Without this it would have been impossible for minds external to one another ever to become coördinated, and equally impossible for any coördination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of one brain. In considering the affection of one idea by another, we encounter three elements: the intrinsic quality of the idea as a feeling; the energy with which it affects other ideas; the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it. As an idea spreads, the first element remains nearly unchanged, the second gets rapidly reduced, the third increases. Now a finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series of feelings, and when these become welded together in association, the result is a general idea. The first character of an idea resulting from this continuous spreading and generalization is that it is a living feeling. A continuance of this feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt.

The mental law follows the forms of logic. By induction, a number of sensations followed by one reaction become united under one general idea followed by the same reaction; by the hypothetical process, a number of reactions called for by one occasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same occasion; by deduction, the habit fulfils its function of calling out certain reactions on certain occasions. But no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its character. The mind is not subject to 'law' in the same rigid sense that matter is. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity in its action without which it would be dead. When we consider that,

according to the principle which we are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general idea is a living feeling, we have taken one step toward the understanding of personality. Personality is some kind of coördination of ideas, and coördination implies a teleological harmony which is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end. A general idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious.

The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic (II). J. E. McTAGGART. *Mind*, I, 2, pp. 188-205.

The conclusion reached in the first paper was that the dialectic cannot fully represent in any part of its movement the real and essential nature of pure thought, but obscures this under particulars which are not essential, and so may be regarded as in some degree subjective. The discrepancy arises from the fact that, whereas the true process — which follows the essence of the actual process in time, and which alone is preserved and summed up in the Absolute Idea — is a direct process from one term which exists only in the transition to another; the actual process, on the other hand, is one from contradictory to contradictory, each of which is conceived as possessing some stability and independence. Secondly, it is subjective, because it does not fully express its own meaning, the meaning of the process forwards. The dialectic advance has mixed up with it elements which do not belong to the true advance, but are due to our original ignorance about the latter, of which we only gradually get rid.

Nevertheless, this subjectivity of the dialectic does not lessen its significance or practical importance, for it is a method of arriving at truth. It is of importance that the end should be reached, that we should advance to the Absolute Idea; but the steps by which we reach this may contain mistakes. Again, the element of indirectness which is introduced by the movement from thesis to antithesis diminishes as the dialectic proceeds, and in the ideal type wholly dies away. Confirmation of this view is found by examining the all-including triad given by H. as Logic, Nature, and Spirit. Here we have all the characteristics of the Notion; the second term is to be regarded, not as in opposition to, but as the completion of the first. The transition can be stated in the form which is used of the lower categories, *i.e.* we may take as thesis pure thought, and for antithesis the element of Immediacy in experience. We see that when the whole ground of the dialectic process is covered in a single triad, either method may be used, which suggests that the two methods are approximate to the two ends of the series which are here

united by a single step. The method which H. adopted is the more correct and convenient, yet its use alone, without the knowledge that it does not exclude the concurrent use of the latter as equally legitimate, has led to grave misconceptions of the system. For the method which H. did not adopt has the advantage of bringing out the fact that immediacy is as important and ultimate a factor in reality as Logic is, and one which is irreducible to it. The two terms are exactly on a level. The dialectic system, then, makes no attempt to eliminate the elements of immediacy in experience or to deduce existence from essence, but we learn from it that in the universe is realized the whole of reason and nothing but reason.

Our Monism: The Principles of a Consistent Unitary World-View. ERNST HAECKEL. *Monist*, 2, 4, pp. 481-487.

(1) Monism exists in opposition to whatsoever comes between nature and mind, between the world and God. *Natur-philosophie* embraces the entire body of human knowledge, and becomes really philosophy when it has brought together results which analysis has ascertained. (2) Mechanicalism: mechanical causes, in the sense of Kant, are assumed as the sole effective cause and are placed in opposition to teleological causes. (3) Psychism: all matter is ensouled. This is exemplified by chemical affinity, by the 'irritability' of lower organisms, by the feeling and will of man. (4) Theism: the only idea of God logically compatible with monism is that which views him as the sum-total of the forces of the universe, which is inseparable from the sum-total of the matter of the universe. (5) Materialism: all the phenomena of the world are founded upon material processes. Yet matter did not originally exist alone and then secondarily create force or mind. (6) Spiritualism: feeling is as fundamental a property of the atom as is attraction or repulsion. Every 'spirit' is inseparably united with some 'matter.' Yet force did not originally exist and then secondarily create matter. (7) The 'belief in immortality' is scientifically tenable only as a general proposition equivalent to the conservation of energy. The 'human soul' is simply a transient, developmentary phenomenon. (8) Cosmism: the principles of world-conception laid down may also be designated *cosmism*, to the extent that they proceed from the fundamental idea that the 'world-process,' as world-development, is, within certain limits, a knowable natural process. Cosmism is thus opposed to agnosticism.

Lotze's Antithesis between Thought and Things, I. A. EASTWOOD. Mind, I, 3, pp. 305-325.

We might say that the root-conception of L.'s system is the assumption that some external objective reality distinct from human thought exercises a causative action upon our minds. L.'s first concession toward rectifying his mistake is that thought is in part constitutive of knowledge, the reason being that each of two objects which act upon one another contributes from its own nature to the resultant effect. But he makes a second, and still greater, concession to the importance of the work of thought. Thought always colors objects given to it, but sometimes it even makes its own objects entirely out of its own nature. We must now examine those claims to be independent which 'things' put forth. Why are 'things' more than thoughts? First, because they account for the *a posteriori* element in knowledge. As such an element is excluded from L.'s narrow and formal view of thought, it must be referred to an unknown, outside thought. But this is not enough. The *a posteriori* element might be a flux of particulars, in which case 'things,' being void of permanent qualities, could not be the subject-matter of a theory. It is therefore necessary to universalize 'things,' so that metaphysical attributes may be predicated of them. Thought had previously been stripped of its concrete particularity, in order that 'things' might be clothed with reality; now its universality is borrowed from it, in order that 'things' may be invested with the only property which can make them cognizable. For L. time is transcendently real. If tenable, this view constitutes the stronghold of his system. Cause and effect differ from reason and consequence in that the former are in time, the latter not. Now if time-relationship is in any way applicable to 'supersensuous' or 'intelligible' 'things,' it at once becomes possible to invest those 'things' with a causal activity. No sooner has L. completed his vindication of the 'reality' of time than he is seized with an uneasy foreboding that he has committed himself to a doctrine incompatible with the ultimate goal of his philosophy. It is to the philosophy of religion, he concludes, that we must look for help.

Du quelques Idées du Baron d'Holbach. ANDRÉ LALANDE.
Rev. Ph., XVII, 6, pp. 601-621.

From one end to the other of Holbach's *Système de la Nature*, which is regarded to-day as an exploded materialism of the past, we recognize the essential traits of modern evolutionist philosophy as this is embodied in Spencer. We find there nature conceived as a real existence independent of our mind and possessing in itself a system of simple, uniform,

and immutable laws. This realism is complemented by a corresponding theory of knowledge, according to which reason is the gradual product of an experience more or less long, and gives a faithful representation of the order in the external world. These premises condition the adoption of the 'natural' method, which consists in always reasoning from the physical to the moral, from the inferior to the superior. H. explicitly advocates this method and strictly follows it in his work, rising by degrees from the fundamental laws of matter to the highest principles of the intellectual and social world. The science of ethics crowns the edifice. This science H. considers as the goal of every philosophy. Here, too, we find an essential agreement with empirical and evolutionist morals. Morality is regarded as a part of universal conduct and interpreted physically; the good is reduced to the useful and the useful to the pleasant; moral instinct is explained by experience, heredity, environment, and justified by its happy consequences; optimism and determinism are taught. There is also a singular similarity of spirit, method, and views between the *Principles of Sociology* and *Data of Ethics* and the *Système de la Nature*. In the conception of a problem, in the manner of conducting an explanation and of employing examples, in the turn of the arguments, even in the tone of the discussion, we discover a striking resemblance, and by a singular chance the fundamental idea of this philosophy finds expression in passages which might be called mates. Compare the beginning of the *Data of Ethics* with the motto of the *Système de la Nature*: "*Naturae rerum vis atque majestas in omnibus momentis fide caret, si quis modo partes ejus, ac non totam complectatur animo.*"

L'Inconnaisable dans la Philosophie Moderne. G. FONSEGRIVE.
Rev. Ph., XVII, 7, pp. 1-17.

According to Positivism, only facts and laws are knowable, there being neither substances nor causes, hence neither bodies, souls, nor God. But since the observer sees only a narrow field of events and yet feels that there must be an immense mass of phenomena outside of the reach of consciousness, in the past and in the future, the domain of the unknowable is very large. On the Kantian hypothesis, the physical mystery of Positivism disappears, the constancy of natural laws is vouchsafed, but a metaphysical mystery arises. It is impossible to show whether anything objective corresponds to these mental forms. The existence as well as the essence of the soul, the external world and God cannot be known. The realm of the unknowable is impenetrable by reason; faith alone is left us here.

Had Criticism succeeded in overthrowing Empiricism, Kant would be

right. But his hypothesis is weak and unintelligible. What can an innate idea be before consciousness? A thought before thinking! Say that these ideas mean mental laws. Then you must hypostasize a subject as bearer of these laws. Then the theory contradicts itself, for one of its conclusions makes the existence of the mind problematical. If, however, you deny the reality of the mind and regard the *a priori* forms as mere abstractions resulting from mental analysis, what follows? Either an idealistic theory according to which everything is knowable, since everything is idea, and against which consciousness protests; or a dogmatism which holds that our ideas represent something, that they are in consciousness a product whose factors must be sought outside of it. Hence these laws will have an objective validity, and we are justified in constructing a truly scientific metaphysics.

F. adopts this latter view. Neither the existence nor the essence of objects is unknown to us. The existence of the soul, the world, and God is known to us, the essence of these partially knowable by the effects which they produce in us and which consist in thoughts and perceptions. To God we may ascribe as qualities the effects produced by him in the world; among these we enroll consciousness and thought. However great the sphere of the unknowable remains for such a philosophy as this, the knowledge it yields is sufficient for our guidance.

Die Wirklichkeit als Phänomen des Geistes. A. ROSINSKI. (II Schluss.) Phil. Mon., XXVIII, 5 u. 6, pp. 257-277.

Reality is given us by means of sense-perception. The self can ascribe existence to the things to which it refers the various contents of perception only in case they have become its presentations. The consciousness of independence of me is a quality of my presentation of the object; it is the characteristic idea which distinguishes this presentation from others. Being is a category, a necessary rule of thinking, by which the object first gets its objective character. If I say 'A is,' I express the objectification of A simply through the category of being; but since the categories are only functions of thinking, and so purely subjective forms of spirit, the objects get their objectivity only through us. Reality cannot have the significance of absoluteness, but must rather have that of relativity. Things must be endowed with such a nature that the laws by which they become things find application to them; they can belong only to the sphere of the laws themselves; they must therefore be pure phenomena of spirit. Neither consciousness nor its object can exist for itself; consciousness has existence only in (*an*) its object. If neither outer nor inner objects appear to us, our consciousness, too, must disappear. Subject and object mutually condition one another.

Together they form a complex, an immanent unity subsisting by mutual dependence. Herbart's notion of an absolute positing is self-contradictory — as posited, the object would be in us, and as absolute, it would be quite apart from us. It is just as if we should say that the table is in the room and not in it at the same time. The truth of knowledge is dependent only on its agreement with the laws of the understanding. These laws fully satisfy our feeling of conviction and impulse to know. The concept is developed into the judgment by subjecting itself to the identity of the self. The equality of the concept with itself is only the objectified expression of the identity of the self. Since knowledge is possible only through categories, and that, too, only when the categories form an immanent unity with the identity of the self, and since the identity of the self involves the relativity of its object, all knowledge, and so the entire world-picture, is only subjective. This applies not only to things, but to selves. All spirits are only in my spirit — every self is only a phenomenal form of my self. The moral order of the world is a necessary form of evolution of the absolute self. In monism, to which I hold, God would be the absolute self, over against whom stand all individual selves as his phenomena. He is not an absolute-real, but an absolute-ideal essence.

Ueber die Einseitigkeit der herrschenden Krafttheorie. N.
VON SERLAND. Z. f. Ph., C, 1, pp. 50–79.

It is the constant progress in the organic, and especially in the psychical sphere, which has led the author to doubt the constancy of the sum of energy in the universe as a whole. His own thesis is that “the sum of the real forces, *i.e.* those which are understood in the law of the conservation of energy, are not constant, but steadily increasing in the course of the world's history. The thing, however, which furnishes this supply is an unknown and indefinite existence, which we cannot indeed name nothing, but yet we are not in a position to say anything further of it.”

In the lives of plants, animals, and men we constantly see new properties and relations arise, and those already existing becoming stronger, without being able to explain these through any existing sum of forces. Living organisms do not simply react like machines upon one invariable stimulus, but respond purposively to the most varied forms of excitement. The organisms, too, become modified, and when these modifications become permanent as a result of them, a higher stage of life is made possible. Nothing is more common than to speak of ‘natural forces’ and to forget that the bases of these forces are themselves indefinite and unknown. We constantly see organic beings,

particularly men, advance through an indefinite number of stages and develop from their original nature new properties and forces. But this original nature is only an indefinite somewhat out of which the forces must be produced, and what is produced is generally higher and more complex than the stimulus.

The development of memory and the other intellectual powers cannot be supposed to take place at the expense of other vital forces; for if the development has been harmonious, if the body has not been neglected or misused, the individual is physically stronger than before. Further, contact with persons or things calls forth new dispositions and feelings, and deepens those which already exist; *i.e.* produces new psychical forces without necessitating any loss. Stimuli of a negative character, like cold, hunger, pain, have a similar effect. Painful psychical experiences are most important for the genesis of positive moral qualities. All advance is the result of strain, of suffering, of conflict. If we ask for the source of this additional spiritual force, the question cannot be answered from the standpoint of the prevailing theory of energy.

HISTORICAL.

Ernst Platner's und Kant's Erkenntnisstheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus. A. WRESCHNER. Z. f. Ph., C, I, pp. 1-25.

Three editions of Ernst Platner's chief philosophical work, *Philosophical Aphorisms*, appeared between 1776 and 1800. The second edition was published in 1784, and, as it was nearly completed before the publication of Kant's *K. d. r. V.*, it does not show any great influence of this latter. The third edition, as a result of this influence, however, was very much modified, and, as P. said in his preface, the work appeared in a completely changed form. Besides the *K. d. r. V.*, Tetens's *Philosophical Essays* seem to have exerted a great influence upon P. This influence is especially prominent in the modification which the second edition received. It is also shown, when in the third edition P. protests against Kant's separation of sense and understanding. Tetens, although discriminating between feeling and perception, and showing the former to be a passive modification of the mind, while the latter involves a judgment, yet repeatedly insisted that both have one origin. He sought to show that all activities of the mind, feeling, understanding, and will, are of the same nature, and are only distinguished from each other by degree. Schulze's *Aenesidemus* also seems to have made a great impression upon P. The scepticism of the third edition seems to owe

its origin in great measure to this work. Although P. owes more to Kant in the third edition than to either of these works, yet he takes up a critical attitude to the firm foundations and exact boundaries which the latter professes to have found for knowledge in the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic*. It is also clear that, although influenced by Kant, he sought to find an independent position for himself. As he said, Kant's writings gave him "matter for consideration and stimulus for controversy."

La Dottrina Metafisico-Psycologica di Andrea Cesalpino. GIOVANNI MARCHESINI, R. I., d. Fil., Vol. II, 7th year.

Andrea Cesalpino's philosophy is essentially obscure, because he would not allow himself to speak openly, being the body-physician of Clement VIII. Yet his love of freedom induces him to speak with sufficient clearness to enable us to understand his standpoint.

He was born 1519. Studied medicine. He took up Aristotle with a view to interpreting him correctly and thus to fight scholastic interpretations. Professed medical philosophy in the University of Pisa. From there was called to the Collegio di Sapienza in Rome by Clement VIII, who made him his body-physician. Died 1603.

Much of his work is valuable. He anticipated in a way Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood, having described the "little circulation" of the lungs. Invented a botanical system based on the form of the flowers and the fruit. His book, *De plantis* which Cuvier calls "une œuvre de génie," shows traces of his studies in Aristotle. His fame among his contemporaries was extraordinary; Torelli, one of his most violent enemies, says of him: "Caesalpiniana dogmata majore apud nostros fuerunt in pretio, quam olim apud Graecas Apollinis oracula." His works are: *Quaestionum peripateticarum libri quinque*, Venice, 1571. *Quaestiones medicae*, Florence, 1569. *De plantis*. The argument of *Quaestiones III* is: The central force (*il primo motore*) is speculative, not active (*attiva*) intelligence. The object of this intelligence is *truth*, and it draws from things their forms. (Notice the inconsistency.) In *Quaestiones VI* he tries to prove that intelligence is one, viz. God. As he says that the knowledge which the divine intelligence has of itself amounts to a knowledge of all things, A. C.'s enemies were not wrong in calling him a pantheist. He felt this, and tried to refute the accusation by subtle counter-arguments. In *Quaestiones VIII* he tries to prove that the soul is immortal. The soul alone has an independent function. In spite of inconsistencies and obscurities, A. C. played an important part in the emancipation of Aristotelian thought from scholastic rules.